Date/Time
Date(s) - 28/03/2025 10:30 am - 11:30 am
Description: Many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection. Existing tools largely analyze only one problem at a time. In this talk Henrique Castro-Pires proposes a new method — decoupling — to analyze both problems at once in several cases. He will provide simple tests to check when the method is valid, and a numerical algorithm to implement it.
Bio:Henrique Castro-Pires is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Miami Herbert Business School, University of Miami. He received his Ph.D. in Managerial Economics and Strategy from the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, in 2022. His research interests lie in the field of microeconomic theory, including mechanism design, organizational economics, and personnel economics. His recent research has focused on the design of incentive schemes, subjective performance evaluations, and how compensation schemes affect the selection of workers who join a given firm or organization. His work has been published in top journals in the field, such as the American Economic Review, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the Games and Economic Behavior.